Kaplan on Demonstratives. Demonstratives, Indexicals, Pure Indexicals. The best way to start is to get clear on Kaplan’s terminology. Indexicals. Indexicals are words whose meaning depends on context. Kaplan distinguishes between pure indexicals (e.g. I, here, now) and true demonstratives (e.g. that. had written out the formal semantics for my Logic of Demonstratives. David Kaplan is writing at 10 A.M. on 3/26/77, or (ii) the ‘proposition’ that David. Kaplan .
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Richard endorses a maximal theory. Suppose that John is in a pizza parlor, and observes a customer in a mirror who appears to be too thin to be healthy. University of Minnesota Press. Therefore, direct reference theories of indexicals are incorrect. That is some reason to think that complex demonstratives are quantifier phrases. So it is highly artificial to suppose that every context contains a sequence of demonstrata. See Vlach and Kamp for early examples of semantic theories that use double-indexing.
King argues for this latter view. Many philosophers hold that indexicals have two sorts of meaning.
David Kaplan, Demonstratives – PhilArchive
Yet my utterance of 5 is clearly false: Two Challenges Posed by True Demonstratives There are several challenges in spelling out a formal theory of true demonstratives. King defends an elaborate theory of the quantificational meanings of complex demonstratives, and shows how this theory accommodates a wide range of linguistic data.
Kaplan uses standard methods to define truth for a formula, and denotation for a term, with respect to any given structure, context, time, world and assignment of values to variables. Kaplan b presents a semantics for indexicals that attempts to describe their various meanings.
When Truth Gives OutOxford: A theory that says that an expression is context- in sensitive is an invariantist theory. An encyclopedia of philosophy articles written by professional philosophers.
Is this property a part of the content of the entire complex demonstrative? An Essay on Reference and IntentionalityMinneapolis: Indices represent by standing in some kind of intimate relation to their objects.
A strict contextualist theory would claim that this adjective is a unary predicate whose content in any context is a unary property. Relative to any context c and possible world w[the x: Problems for a Quantificational Theory of Oaplan Demonstratives. He also assumes that propositions are the things that agents assert and believe.
Nathan Salmon, in Reference and Essencecalls such terms obstinately rigid designators. See also StephensonRichardCappelen and Hawthorne Sign in to use this feature.
History of Western Philosophy. Call this token t 2. A structured proposition which, like the preceding one, has an individual as a constituent, is a singular proposition. John is in a grocery store, pushing a shopping cart. Literal MeaningCambridge: An occurrence of a word or phrase e within a larger phrase E may be thought of as a state of affairs: For example, let w be a possible world in which Barack Obama lost to Mitt Romney in the November presidential election. See von FintelStanley and Szabo Each context has an associated agent, time, position, and world.
Those who think that modals are semantically like quantifiers over possible worlds typically hold that the content of a modal, in a context, is the same as a restricted quantifier over possible worlds, where the relevant restriction varies from context to context.
But to say that the content of 23 relative to c is true at the circumstance c W of c is just to say that 23 is true relative to c.
Academic Tools How to cite this entry. Thus this alternative theory effaces two obvious differences between 32 and For Burks, the indexical meaning of a token is what someone must know about that token in order to determine what that token represents. John Perry ;pp. This article has no associated abstract. Yet the status of 26 as a logical truth has proven controversial. Therefore, I am not a brain in a vat. An agent can be in one of these belief states while failing to be in another.
Speakers seem kaplzn use complex demonstratives to refer to individuals in much the way that they use simple demonstratives.